

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

PRIVATE

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OF MICHIGAN

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THIRTY-THIRD MEETING

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 8 May 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. de MELLO-FRANCO

(Brazil)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.A. de MELLO-FRANCO
Mr. RODRIGUES RIFAS
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE
Miss M. GOES

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. N. MINTCHEV
Mr. G. GUELEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U Tin MAUNG
U Aye LWIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY
Mr. J.F.M. BELL
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK
Mr. M. ZEMLA
Mr. E. PEPICH
Mr. J. BUCEK

Ethiopia:

Mr. P. SAHLOU
Mr. M. HAMID
Mr. A. MANDEFRO

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. C.K. GAIROLA
Mr. G.D. COMMAR

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. GONZALEZ GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. M. BIEN
Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. M. MALITZA
Mr. C. SANDRU
Mr. T. MANOLIU

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDBERG
Mr. G.A. WESTRING
Mr. H. BLIX
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. I.G. USACHEV
Mr. V.N. ZHEREBTSOV

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. A. EL-ERIAN
Mr. M.S. AHMED
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

United Kingdom:

Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. J.S.H. SHATTOCK
Mr. J.H. LAMBERT
Lord NORWICH

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. V. BAKER
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Brazil) (translation from French): I declare open the thirty-third meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French): The Polish delegation considers that the discussion on the provisions concerning the first stage of disarmament is of fundamental importance for the whole work of the Conference. Indeed, we start from the principle that the measures taken during that first stage will govern the whole disarmament process: they will determine whether favourable conditions for carrying out general and complete disarmament in the shortest possible time are created at the outset; and they will determine whether a propitious political atmosphere is established - an atmosphere that will reduce tension, increase confidence between peoples, strengthen the feeling of security, and thus facilitate the whole process of disarmament and appreciably simplify solution of the control problem.

I wish to speak about some problems arising out of a comparative examination of the two documents we have before us.

In our opinion, the different approaches of the United States /ENDC/30 and Corr.17 and Soviet /ENDC/27 documents to disarmament measures in the first stage reflect two different concepts. The Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament provides, in the first stage, for measures of great military significance which would lead not only to quantitative but also to qualitative changes in the military potential of States. The experience of the years of negotiations on disarmament that have taken place up to now shows that the measure which could bring about an immediate and radical change in the present world situation is the elimination of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons.

The discussions at this Conference have strengthened our conviction that the disarmament process should begin with the means of delivering nuclear weapons. It should be noted that the United States has also felt the need to take account in its plan of this same principle that the disarmament process must begin with reduction of the quantity of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. In the United States plan, however, the principle has been distorted; I would even say that it has been deprived of its substance; for its whole meaning lies in the 100 per cent elimination of those vehicles. A 100 per cent elimination would mean the simultaneous neutralization of nuclear weapons, which would have the effect of preventing any potential aggressor from making a surprise nuclear

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

attack. Now whereas the Soviet plan provides for the complete elimination of delivery vehicles in the first stage, the United States proposals provide only for some reduction in their quantity. Furthermore, the American plan does not provide for cessation of the production of nuclear weapons, and does not bar the way to their improvement.

Thus--- and this must be clearly said--- the Western Powers are not willing to remove the danger of a surprise nuclear attack, to remove the feeling of insecurity, or to create conditions that would pave the way for other disarmament measures. That is the fundamental difference between the two concepts.

How do the Western Powers justify their opposition to the proposal for complete elimination of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons during the first stage of disarmament? They endeavour to create the impression that in acting in this way they are guided by prudence, by a feeling for realism, and the like. For instance, at the meeting on 24 April Mr. Dean, the representative of the United States, said:

"... it (the Soviet proposal) just is not realistic. We all know that nuclear delivery vehicles cannot be eliminated all at once."

(ENDC/PV.26, page 12)

In his speech on 3 May ENDC/PV.30, page 67 Mr. Burns, the Canadian representative, also questioned the possibility of complete and rapid elimination of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons, basing his objections on two arguments: first, that such elimination would require complete control over the whole territory concerned, to determine whether delivery vehicles had not been hidden somewhere; secondly, that it was difficult to define such vehicles, and that if the means of delivering nuclear weapons, in the strict sense of the term, were eliminated, it would still be possible to adapt other means to deliver such weapons.

In the opinion of the Polish delegation, neither of those two objections is valid. Under the provisions of the Soviet draft treaty, States would be under an obligation to submit to complete control all acts connected with the elimination, or the conversion to peaceful uses, of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. One can hardly ask for a more precise statement on this point than that made by Mr. Zorin, the Soviet representative, at the meetings on 3 and 4 May. He said, among other things, that a 100 per cent elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles would entail a 100 per cent control over such elimination throughout the territory of the country concerned ENDC/PV.30, page 487.

It should be added that the Soviet proposal provides for the extension of control to launching sites for rockets used for peaceful purposes. Hence the question of the danger of such rockets being used for military purposes does not arise either.

As regards the second argument, vehicles for nuclear weapons are a class of armaments which can be fully defined. They have been clearly defined in the Soviet proposals. Under article 2, paragraph 5 of the Soviet draft treaty, as soon as disarmament began, States would be under an obligation to furnish the international disarmament organization with adequate information on the categories of arms to be reduced and the amount of the reductions.

Lastly, what of the argument about the possibility of adapting other means to delivering nuclear weapons? I do not think anyone in this room still believes in the mythical danger of nuclear war-heads being carried in a suitcase, at one time used to frighten credulous people. In their statements the Western delegations constantly revert to the argument that total elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage would cause a disequilibrium of forces. As in the previous cases, the Western Powers present this aspect of the problem the wrong way round.

The Soviet draft provides for a close relationship between the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles during the first stage and the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. Parallel to the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles, the draft fixes a ceiling for the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States. Attention must also be drawn to the provision in article 11, under which force levels for other States parties to the treaty are to be agreed upon as appropriate. This should be understood to mean that the levels will be fixed to meet the security requirements of the States concerned, without disturbing the balance of forces, in particular under the conditions obtaining when delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons have been completely eliminated.

It must be concluded from this that the argument of a possible disequilibrium of forces is intended to justify the desire of the Western Powers to retain their nuclear weapon vehicles and thus to continue the dangerous policy of the so-called balance of terror. Thus it is not a question of the balance of forces, which the Soviet draft does not impair, but of the balance of terror. What does such a balance lead to? There is no need to go into that here.

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

This is not the first time that our delegation has heard this kind of argument. The Western Powers constantly exploit the argument of the so-called imbalance of forces in connexion with the Polish plan for establishing a denuclearized zone in Europe, although it is known that the second version of that plan provides both for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons and for the reduction of conventional armaments, precisely because this type of objection has been taken into account, regardless of how far it is justified.

If we are to discuss the need to maintain the balance of forces we must also raise, quite unequivocally, the question of the bases on the territory of foreign States which closely encircle the socialist countries. The dismantling of bases and the withdrawal of armed forces from foreign territory, and the destruction of all delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons, are two inseparable elements of balanced disarmament during the first stage.

Speaking on the problem of bases on 3 May, Mr. Dean tried to convince us that if the rockets, aircraft, submarines and ships capable of carrying nuclear weapons were eliminated in the process of disarmament, the American bases would be rendered useless and consequently should not cause the Soviet Union and the other socialist States any anxiety.

But if that is the case, why do the Western Powers not agree to the dismantling of these bases during the first stage of disarmament, as proposed in the Soviet draft? It may be asked what the American and British soldiers would do if deprived of the weapons which are the whole reason for the existence of these bases. Would they play golf? They can do that at home, where they would certainly find it more agreeable.

The Western opposition to such a measure can be understood in only one way. The Western States are unwilling to eliminate the delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. Hence they are not prepared to dismantle their bases on foreign territory either, for it is the launching sites for rockets carrying nuclear weapons that are the essential feature of those bases.

I now turn to the next measure provided for in the first stage of disarmament: reduction of the armed forces and conventional armaments of States.

In the statements they have made so far, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom have tried to represent the Soviet proposals as vague, obscure, and even as having little significance from the viewpoint of the scope of disarmament. Mr. Dean has even tried to show that the Soviet draft would enable armed forces to scrap obsolete types of weapon without thereby reducing their fighting capacity.

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

It must be strongly emphasized that under the Soviet plan the reduction of conventional armed forces is to be carried out by complete - I repeat, complete - disbandment of military units. At the same time, all the conventional arms, munitions and equipment, that is to say the whole--- I say the whole--- armament of the disbanded units are to be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. An appropriate reduction in the armaments industry of States would be carried out primarily by the closing, abolition or conversion to peaceful uses of whole--- I repeat whole--- undertakings now engaged in armaments production.

If we add to this that the Soviet draft also provides, in the first stage, for the destruction of armaments for reserve forces and the reduction of budget appropriations for military purposes, what remains of the arguments we have heard here about the alleged lack of concrete measures in the Soviet draft and its alleged lack of precision as regards the quantities and categories of arms to be reduced?

The United States delegation maintains that its proposals on armed forces and conventional armaments are more concrete and more effective. But what is adduced in support of that assertion? The enumeration of a series of details concerning weights and types of weapons? It must be pointed out that insistence on minor details is not always synonymous with concreteness, and still less with efficiency. The technical particulars listed in such detail cannot conceal the fact that, as we have already said, the reduction in nuclear weapon vehicles is partial and therefore not effective. Furthermore, the United States plan refers to only four types of weapon to be reduced in quantity, so that it is the United States plan, not the Soviet plan, which leaves a gap in the elimination of conventional weapons.

Under the Soviet plan all the arms of the disbanded units would be destroyed; under the United States plan some of the conventional armaments would not be subject to reduction, even proportionately to the units disbanded.

The reduction in armed forces provided for in the United States plan, as other delegations have already pointed out, is insignificant. It is interesting to recall here that Mr. Godber chose a very strange method of justifying so insignificant a reduction of armed forces as that provided for in the United States plan. Is it because, as he said on 2 May,

"... in modern warfare it is the armaments that are decisive rather than the number of men ..." (ENDC/PV.29, page 9)

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

that Mr. Godber thinks it would be more reasonable to fix the ceiling for armed forces at 2,100,000 instead of 1,700,000 men? Incidentally, if the Western Powers have arrived at the conclusion that modern weapons of mass destruction are more important than the number of men, they should reconsider the arguments they have advanced up to the present concerning the numerical superiority of the armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, which, they claim, prevents the West from carrying out radical disarmament measures within the framework of general disarmament, or measures to reduce tension, such as the establishment of a de-nuclearized zone in Europe. The Mr. Godber of 4 May repudiates the Mr. Godber of 2 May, for on 4 May the United Kingdom representative maintained that if the Soviet proposals were accepted, the Soviet Union would have an overwhelming superiority at the end of the first stage.

I should like to end my remarks with the following conclusion. Given that, as we have demonstrated in our argument, the first stage of disarmament determines the fate of the whole disarmament process, it should comprise sufficiently important and radical disarmament measures; and, what is more, the first stage should be carried out quickly, in a comparatively very short time. In that respect we fully agree with the representative of India that the more radical and rapid the process of disarmament, the less importance will attach to what remains of the armaments of States during that process.

The nations are demanding an agreement on general and complete disarmament with increasing impatience. The Polish public, which is attentively following the course of the Geneva talks, cannot refrain from showing its increasing concern at the attitude adopted by the Western Powers at Geneva and at the new impetus given to the arms race by the Western militarist forces, a recent example of which is provided by the NATO resolutions at Athens. The concern and wishes of the Polish people in that regard were forcefully expressed by Mr. Vladislav Gomulka in his speech at Warsaw on 1 May. Mr. Gomulka said, in particular: "We demand that the disarmament negotiations at Geneva be devoted to constructive discussion on the forms of disarmament under effective international control, and not to sterile debates on the control of armaments. We demand general and complete disarmament". That is what all the peoples demand. Implementation of the effective measures provided for in the first stage of the Soviet plan would open up for mankind a real road towards general and complete disarmament.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I listened most attentively to the statement by the Polish representative comparing the Soviet and the United States disarmament proposals in respect of the first stage -- a comparison which was naturally to the advantage of the Soviet draft. I intend to study it very thoroughly.

This morning, however, I wish to refer to the work of the Conference last week, which gave rise to very comprehensive discussions on several problems. I should like this morning to consider three of the problems raised: the atmosphere of the Conference, our method of work, and certain aspects of the first stage of disarmament directly connected with our most essential security requirements.

At last Friday's meeting [ENDC/PV.31] particular reference was made, among other things, to the tone of our discussions and the atmosphere of this Conference. The representatives of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and India mentioned those matters in their statements. I myself sincerely hope that the relaxed and almost--- sometimes even quite--- friendly tone of our discussions will never be lacking during this Conference. That is a very important factor. We are here to improve the international situation and to reduce mutual distrust, nay more, to formulate an agreement that will restore confidence. We should always bear that in mind; for me, it is a matter of fundamental concern. Nevertheless, I think we must also be frank and explain ourselves clearly. We should be failing in our duty to be honest with each other if we did not give clear expression to our thoughts, even if they are negative in regard to some proposals.

In regard to our method of work, which was also discussed again last Friday, I fear that it is not by marathon speeches at plenary meetings that we can make easier and faster progress. In our opinion the right method, as we have already said, is to set to work actively on the simultaneous study of several problems, by setting up sub-committees.

Each sub-committee should study one specific subject, and make progress with the drafting of the treaty. At the same time, we should revert to what I consider the very useful practice of holding informal or private meetings in order to avoid polemics about the records, every word of which is open to different and sometimes misleading interpretations.

I also note with some concern that the Committee of the Whole which was set up at the beginning of this Conference is not progressing fast enough with its work. In that connexion, certain comments made recently by the Soviet delegation

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

might cause us some anxiety. I believe we set up the Committee of the Whole to reach agreement on specific measures, a list of which was drawn up by both sides. So far we have agreed to discuss only one question in this Committee -- the question of war propaganda, which was proposed by the Soviet delegation. It seems to me that it is high time to consider at least one Western proposal, after which I myself should be quite willing to have another measure proposed by the Soviet delegation placed on the Committee's agenda.

We still consider that, while continuing with the drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, which is undoubtedly the main object of our work, we should not neglect any possibility of specific agreement on concrete disarmament measures that could be put into effect immediately and could bring about an immediate improvement in the international situation. We regard that as a matter of urgency and I hope that this view will be shared by other delegations.

I should now like to refer, in a general and preliminary manner, to various proposals put forward for carrying out the first stage of disarmament which do not appear to us to conform to the principle of security and balance in disarmament unanimously adopted as the basis for our work. I hope in so doing to give the representative of Poland, who spoke just now, some food for thought.

These problems are all the more delicate in that their solution, or rather the rate of their solution, has a most direct and immediate bearing on the security of the Western countries, as now organized on the basis of quite obvious geographical facts. In other words, the solution of these problems directly affects the collaboration between the Western allies, which, so long as disarmament has not been carried out, is the practical foundation of the security of the countries belonging to the Atlantic Alliance and, I would even say, of the security of the world.

If we are to do constructive work here, we must not close our eyes to the fact that unfortunately we are still living in a world where there is mutual distrust. That is why, in recent years, two military defence organizations have been set up by the two sides. So long as disarmament has not been carried out, those organizations will remain based on strategic, geographic and demographic facts which our disarmament proposals cannot disregard. I would go further and say that, if these facts were disregarded, one of two things would happen: either we should not succeed in concluding an agreement, or the agreement would be contrary to the fundamental principles of disarmament, and hence would not increase our security but would even endanger it.

At a certain moment in our history, after the Second World War, some countries, including Italy, felt themselves to be in danger. It was the time of the Stalin policy. I say that, not in a controversial spirit, but as an unquestionable fact known to everyone. We in Western Europe have free and democratic regimes, which communism considers due for liquidation. These regimes are rooted in our civilization, to which we hold fast and which we wish to preserve. In preserving and defending them we do not wish to injure any other regime of a different kind, because we fully respect the independence and sovereignty of all States and the right of peoples freely to choose their institutions and their way of life.

In that connexion I should like to quote what Mr. Segni, our Minister for Foreign Affairs, said here on 16 March:

"We wish to assure those peoples who differ from us in their concept of life that we, who belong to an ancient and great civilization that finds inspiration in the principles of freedom, harbour no plan, no desire to interfere in any manner whatsoever with their peaceful development and progress." (ENDC/PV.3, page 14)

Thus, faced with the dangers from the East, the weaker European countries joined together in an alliance with a more powerful and distant country which follows the same principles of liberty as we do. That alliance built up a military organization which is purely defensive, both in its origin and in its subsequent development. This truth has been stated a hundred times by all the Western statesmen, and the events of the last fifteen years have justified their claim. This military organization, under the protection of which our peace-loving peoples find security, was built up by integrating and co-ordinating our efforts and our potentialities in accordance with a geographical position familiar to everyone. A feature of that geographical position is that the weaker countries of Western Europe are separated from their American ally by about 5,000 kilometres of sea.

Facing us, facing our military organization, there is, as I have already said, another military organization, that of the Warsaw Treaty, which forms a united and compact territorial bloc backed by the immense territory of another communist country. By its statements and its acts, that country pursues a policy which does not seem consistent with the statements we often hear elsewhere, which are based on the principles of peaceful co-existence and in which we are willing to believe, though we are waiting for them to be borne out by the facts.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

From the viewpoint of Western Europe, these countries of the East form a geographical whole of enormous area with a demographic potential far greater than ours. Naturally, this Eastern bloc has built its bases which, although they can be called national bases, are none the less dangerous. I ask you to explain to me what is the difference, as regards the military factor and the degree of danger, which is the factor we have to consider here, between a base of the Western allies established, say, in Turkey and a Warsaw Treaty base established, say, in the Caucasus? If there is any difference it can be reckoned only in terms of efficiency and military power, that is to say the factors which will gradually come within the scope of disarmament.

How then can we be asked to dismantle all the bases of our alliance at the very beginning of disarmament because they are the result of an integration of joint efforts, whereas on the other side all bases are to remain intact simply because someone is pleased to call them national? How can we be asked to forego the help of our major allies, when on the other side the military, political and economic links would remain intact and continue to expand, in fact, to the farthest limits of Asia? That would be equivalent to asking us to dissolve our alliance practically from the beginning of disarmament operations, while the other alliance -- that of the Warsaw Treaty countries -- would remain in being, in full development, linked through the siting of its frontiers with another communist country having a human potential of over 600 millions.

I do not think that such a proposal can be considered to be in conformity with the agreed principles so often recalled here, according to which disarmament measures should be gradual and so balanced that no party gains a military advantage at any stage. Can we forget the duty of every government to ensure its country's security throughout the process of disarmament?

Of course, we are prepared -- and these are not empty words, but the sincere expression of our will -- to go as far as possible and as quickly as possible towards general and complete disarmament in all sectors, eliminating all bases without distinction. For the Italian delegation's view is that, from the beginning of disarmament, the gradual reduction of all armaments, including nuclear weapon vehicles, through the cessation of production of nuclear weapons and their progressive and rapid destruction, will reduce the military strength of all the bases on both sides, and subsequently lead to a time when, as confidence grows in the world, they will be completely eliminated. That is gradual and balanced disarmament.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

We are waiting in hope for the time when it will be possible, without prejudice to the essential requirements of our security, for full mutual trust to prevail in a peaceful world-- a world in which all countries, irrespective of regime, will leave their doors wide open, in which there will be free movement of men and ideas, and the United Nations, duly strengthened, will guarantee the smaller and less powerful States against any attack or threat.

Unfortunately we have not reached that stage yet. To do so, we shall need to make many further efforts here. What is needed is the gradual, concrete and realistic execution of disarmament. To this end, it is necessary to concentrate our work on the sectors concerning which our views are less divergent and not on those concerning which we know our differences are too great to be resolved. It is by gradually increasing the areas of agreement that we shall be able to reach complete agreement more quickly. Any other approach amounts either to not wanting an agreement or, which is worse, to using disarmament as a dangerous and deceptive propaganda weapon.

What, then, are we asking for? We are asking that in the first stage of disarmament, and subsequently, gradual and balanced measures should be put into effect at an increasingly rapid rate, bearing in mind that, as Mr. Segni said here on 28 March, the wall of misunderstanding which separates us must be gradually broken down. In the process of disarmament it is necessary to keep constantly in mind the three pillars which are essential for reaching agreement: disarmament, control and trust. These are the three factors to which the representative of Nigeria referred in his statement last Friday; it is their presence that will guarantee our essential security while disarmament is being carried out.

Disarmament has been compared here to the dangerous evolutions of a tight-rope walker. The comparison is an apt one, for the acrobat must keep his balance all the way in order not to fall and if he is wise, though he advances boldly towards the other end of the rope, he will not neglect to have a good safety net placed beneath him. Without it, he is obviously exposing himself to mortal danger.

The CHAIRMAN (Brazil) (translation from French): I should like to intervene in the discussion, speaking in my capacity as representative of Brazil.

More than half the time allotted to us by the United Nations General Assembly for the preliminary phase of our work at this Conference has now gone by. Although certain delegates in this Committee and some experienced observers have said that

(The Chairman, Brazil)

in spite of everything the results obtained are an advance on those of previous disarmament conferences, the truth is that they are still very meagre as regards any real progress that can be put before the United Nations in the report due on 1 June. They are, in fact, limited to the preamble and the general part of the treaty-- matters which by their nature give rise to less serious disagreement. Thus we must honestly admit that as to all the rest, which represents the major part of our work, the differences between the two great military blocs appear irreconcilable, at least in the near future and so far can be foreseen, as regards both the discontinuance of nuclear tests for warlike purposes and the actual treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Of this treaty on general and complete disarmament I must say, to my great regret, that the Brazilian delegation sees no further ground for optimism in the progress of our work since we reached the substantive articles of the two drafts. The difficulties increase as the questions become more specific, or rather as they lose that generality which facilitates agreement because it leaves more latitude for interpretation. On behalf of my delegation, I shall venture to submit a few modest comments on some of these important questions. I shall begin with those which, in the opinion of my delegation, do not raise absolutely insuperable difficulties.

We have discussed the mandatory nature of the preamble and the general articles of the treaty, which are precisely the parts of this instrument which can be regarded as more or less adopted. Some maintain that these articles are immediately binding; others reject this view, relying on the argument that governments might be prematurely bound by undertakings the full extent of which they would only learn later. In the opinion of my delegation, our differences could be settled if we sought a solution based on legal technique.

With your permission I should like to submit at this point a few thoughts about what seems to me to be a shortcoming in the general negotiations on disarmament: the absence of legal method. Since I am a lawyer by profession, it may perhaps be suspected that my approach to this question is determined by my own professional training or-- should I say--professional bias. But I can assure you that that suspicion would be unfounded. Law, in the last analysis, is also -- and perhaps even mainly -- a technique. Yes, a technique of conciliation which is constantly evolving as change proceeds in the historical and social material it absorbs. When world politics are going through a crisis, as unfortunately they

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are now --- and there is no need to give examples --- it is absurd to speak of a crisis of law. But we can certainly speak of a law of crisis, that is to say of the need for an evolution of legal formulas that will make it possible to use them as a technique or an instrument for reconciling the facts which caused the crisis. Consequently, I must say that I have been extremely surprised at the fact that in drafting a treaty as important as the one we are called upon to draw up, so little recourse has been had to juridical solutions, as if they did not exist or had nothing to contribute.

Reverting to the mandatory nature of the general part of the treaty, the Brazilian delegation wishes to stress that it should be examined in the light of the legal principle which distinguishes between the normative articles of a law or a treaty which, because they merely lay down general rules, are never self-executory, and the operative articles of the same instruments, which are always self-executory. Thus the problem that arises is not whether the provisions are mandatory, but whether they are self-executory. We often find in instruments of municipal public law, particularly in the constitutions of States, many principles which are not self-executory --- that is, which can only be implemented by special complementary laws. I think that is exactly the case of the draft treaties we are examining. There is a general part which, although mandatory, cannot be implemented by itself; it depends on the provisions that are to be negotiated later. What seems to us legally inadmissible is to make part of a treaty non-mandatory.

Another subject of disagreement which might perhaps be settled within the framework of normal legal technique, is the time-limit for implementation of the different chapters of the future treaty. We have heard conflicting views on this subject maintained here by sound arguments. In this connexion it must be pointed out that considerable progress has been made in the study of what has been called intertemporal law, or the study of the criteria according to which the entry into force of legal rules can be established or interpreted chronologically. French, Italian and even Brazilian lawyers have done brilliant work on this question, which is even the subject of many special lectures. It is possible that the existing doubts on the implementation of the treaty by stages would be removed by adequate legal studies which would provide a satisfactory technical basis for overcoming the political difficulties. One solution might be to include in the treaty, at the end of each stage, a few rules of the kind which lawyers call transitional provisions, regulating the problem of the entry into force of the

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different chapters. Such a solution would make it possible to avoid delaying negotiation of the provisions proper, and would give a certain flexibility to the chronological application of the treaty, while maintaining the reciprocal obligations.

There are other questions, however, which are rather more serious and more difficult, and I do not see how we can achieve any results before submitting the preliminary report due in June. At the meeting on 3 May Mr. Burns, the Canadian representative, expressed the view that the most serious disagreement between the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union was on the problem of eliminating delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons ENDC/PV.30, page 77. I agree with General Burns on that point, but I think it could be put more precisely by saying that the main disagreement is on control of the destruction of these vehicles. The question of control is, moreover, a capital one for the whole system of disarmament, not merely for nuclear weapon vehicles; it is, so to speak, the backbone of disarmament.

Generally speaking, both sides agree that there can be no disarmament without control. Many statements have been made to this effect. The difficulties begin when it comes to deciding on systems of control. Following the logic of its own system, the United States, which proposes reductions reckoned per cent, must ask for complete control of the class of armament to be reduced; for otherwise, how could the percentage be verified? In this connexion, Mr. Cavaletti's comments at the meeting of 2 May seem pertinent:

"For it is perfectly obvious that, in order to determine whether a certain percentage of armaments has been destroyed, the quantity remaining must also be verified". (ENDC/PV.29, page 21)

The Soviet Union cannot accept that argument. It regards control of the armaments remaining after partial disarmament as nothing but espionage. It is not for me to say whether this assumption is justified -- wholly or even in part -- as Mr. Godber, the United Kingdom representative, seemed to admit on 2 May, when he said:

"Therefore some way must be found to provide adequate assurance for both sides, while at the same time trying to take account of the fears -- exaggerated fears in my view, but nevertheless fears -- which the Soviet Union has expressed in regard to espionage".

(ibid., page 14)

(The Chairman, Brazil)

In any case, the Brazilian delegation notes that, for the country adopting this view, the logic of the system leads to advocating the total destruction of weapons of certain kinds rather than percentage reductions, and that is the conclusion reached by the Soviet Union. But total destruction, if it is to be acceptable even according to the Soviet reasoning, must be accompanied by total verification. That is exactly what Mr. Godber said in another passage of the statement quoted above, which I will read to you:

"Where there was to be a 100 per cent reduction of a particular category of armaments there would, I assume, under the Soviet plan be a corresponding degree of verification ..." (ibid., page 13)

At the same meeting Mr. Cavalletti expressed similar ideas when he said:

"For disarmament measures in class (1), that is to say total measures, the total elimination of armaments ... would have to be verified by appropriate operations" (ibid., pages 20-21).

Mr. Dean, the United States representative, said in his statement of 3 May:

"By the standards that we have set up in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles [ENDC/5] 100 per cent reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles in stage I, before we had gone on to anything else, would require 100 per cent assurance that that particular measure had been carried out. There is just no other way of destroying 100 per cent of all nuclear delivery vehicles without making 100 per cent inspection in stage I." (ENDC/PV.30, page 45)

To these successive claims Mr. Zorin replied the same day, and the representative of Poland referred to that reply in his statement this morning:

"... if you agree to 100 per cent elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, we will agree to 100 per cent control over this" (ibid., page 48)

On the next day, that is to say 4 May, Mr. Zorin reiterated this statement:

"I answered you yesterday and I answer you today: as regards verification of the 100 per cent reduction or elimination of the means of delivery, we agree to such verification throughout the territory of the Soviet Union." (ENDC/PV.31, page 50)

Thus, in giving an official reply to the questions put by the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and Italy, and to the Canadian representative, who had expressed similar doubts, the representative of the Soviet

(The Chairman, Brazil)

Union raised the question of the destruction of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons -- which Mr. Burns considers to be the most serious point of disagreement between the two blocs -- in terms which must certainly be explored to the farthest limit for any possibility of agreement, to use the very apt words of Mr. San Thiago Dantas, the Brazilian Foreign Minister, at the beginning of the Conference. I shall take the liberty of quoting these words, according to which, if we want peace, the method "consists in exploring the limits of compromise consistent with maintenance of the present levels of security and negotiating up to those limits" /ENDC/PV. 3, page 6/.

In this connexion the Brazilian delegation considers that the zonal inspection system provided for in the United States draft should be taken as a basis for serious studies. Explaining the aims of this text, Ambassador Dean said, at the meeting on 2 May:

"If a system of progressive zonal inspection similar to that which the United States has suggested as an illustration was adopted, then some time during the first year, perhaps at the same time as the first reduction in armaments was being made, the international disarmament organization would actually be inspecting for armaments, not in all of the territory of the parties to the treaty, but in only a relatively small portion of the territory, consisting of one or more of a selected number of zones. The results of this inspection would then be compared with the declarations made by the parties themselves, not only as to their total armaments facilities, but also as to the amounts of armaments located in the various zones. If the results of the declaration coincided with the results of the inspection, there would naturally be an increase in confidence in the declarations on the other zones." (ENDC/PV.29, page 27)

Starting from the principle of prior declarations of armaments made on the responsibility of each government signing the treaty -- and this principle of prior declaration was, I believe, suggested here in Geneva during the 1932 Disarmament Conference -- it would be possible to devise a system of verification that would be both partial and total. It would be partial because it would be applied to only a small part of the territory of the country subjected to it, and total because it could provide a sample of the good faith of the government of that country in regard to its prior total declaration.

(The Chairman, Brazil)

In this connexion I should like to remind you of the statement made by the representative of Nigeria at the meeting on 4 May:

"The real point I am getting at is that we must give further close study to the proposal for zonal inspection, or similar proposals which would enable us to carry out verification of armaments at a significant level. In the opinion of my delegation there is a need to study further the proposal for zonal inspection in relation to the organization, composition and functions of the international disarmament organization. The more it is a game of chance, the more confidence it will generate."

(ENDC/PV.31, page 9)

The delegation of Brazil considers that, as there is general acceptance of total verification of the elimination of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons, the system of division into zones proposed by the United States may be considered to fulfil this aim and at the same time to allay the fears expressed concerning espionage. It should also be observed that, in the statement already quoted, Mr. Dean added the following words:

"The United States does not insist on this method and is prepared to discuss any other, provided it lives up to the criterion that the extent of the inspection during any stage or step would be related to the amount of disarmament being undertaken and to the degree of risk to the parties to the treaty of possible violation." (ENDC/PV.29, page 28)

We know how very difficult it is to devise adequate verification and control procedure on which the two groups could agree, but that procedure is essential if we are to draft a treaty on general and complete disarmament. It seems to us, therefore, that United States Zonal plan for the prohibition of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles could provide a basis for study by the Soviet Union delegation, which has already said that it will agree to 100 per cent control over the complete elimination of these vehicles. If the procedure were found unacceptable, it would then be for the party unable to agree to make alternative suggestions, which would be studied in their turn.

In conclusion I should also like, with your permission, to make a few comments on the problem of bases. The Soviet Union delegation has made various statements showing that it considers the question of United States bases in Europe to be indissolubly linked with that of the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles. In the opinion of the Brazilian delegation there is a certain difference between

"foreign bases" and "bases on foreign territory". "Foreign bases", in the restricted sense of the term, would be bases maintained under old international agreements, which are no longer in keeping with the intentions of the present governments of the countries in which the bases are situated. Unfortunately, bases of this kind still exist today. "Bases on foreign territory", on the other hand, are bases which have been established with the agreement of the countries on whose territory they are situated, by virtue of the legitimate exercise of their constitutional powers in full freedom.

That is how the Brazilian delegation would interpret the legal difference between the different kinds of base. Mr. Zorin seems to recognize the existence of this legal difference, as can be seen from the following passage in his statement of 2 May:

"The measures I have described cover to the fullest extent military bases used by foreign troops, even though in law these bases are at the disposal of the State in whose territory they are located. Why do we consider this necessary? Because as a matter of fact and by reason of their practical consequences, such bases do not differ in any way from foreign military bases situated in alien territory which are under the complete control of the State which has secured them." (ENDC/PV.29, page 43)

I deduce from the Soviet representative's statement that there is a legal difference although there is military parity. Bases on foreign territory are the natural consequence of military alliances for the Western countries, whose strongest ally is thousands of miles away, but that is not the case of the Warsaw Treaty countries, which have no need of such bases because their territories form one continuous whole. As the representative of a country which is not a member of any military alliance, it is not for me to go more deeply into the question, for that would lead my delegation into controversies which it is in duty bound to avoid.

But it seems to us -- and this is the point in which the Brazilian delegation is specially interested -- that in view of the apparently insuperable difficulties in the way of an immediate settlement of this twofold question -- I refer to the prohibition of nuclear weapon vehicles and the elimination of bases on foreign territory -- it seems to us, I say, that it would be better to transfer these measures to the second stage of the treaty. This is precisely the point

(The Chairman, Brazil)

which interests our delegation because, from the discussion of arrangements for drawing up the treaty, I note that the different delegations are prepared to agree to a change in the order of the chapters.

I will not give a direct opinion, for as representative of Brazil, I have nothing to say about the problem of bases itself. It concerns us as a country interested in security and peace, but it does not concern us directly, because we are not parties to any collective treaty of a military nature. But as the representative of a State concerned, above all, to find a way of speeding up the work of drafting a more acceptable treaty on general and complete disarmament, which is a subject we are here to discuss today, I should like to point out that my delegation believes that such a compromise might perhaps be possible.

If the problem is insoluble now, and if no compromise can be reached in the near future, then that is the proposal we feel entitled to submit. I repeat, it seems to us that it would be preferable to defer the matter to the second stage of the treaty. We should then adopt as the first stage the prohibition of nuclear weapons, on which it seems easier to secure unanimous agreement. It is clear that this question of prohibiting weapons under a treaty whose implementation would be effectively controlled, which has already been given general approval by the United Nations and forms one of the main points in the Joint Statement, would be settled with all the precautions I referred to at the beginning of my statement regarding the legal study of the forms of intertemporal law.

The Brazilian delegation has not forgotten that, despite their deep-rooted differences, the representatives of the great Powers have never failed to show their goodwill in endeavouring always to pursue negotiations for disarmament and peace. It is in the hope that positive results can be recorded in the preliminary report in June that we have submitted these few comments.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): The Canadian delegation has listened with great interest to the statements made by the representative of Poland, the representative of Italy and the Chairman, in his capacity as representative of Brazil. The latter statement contained, if I may say so, very many interesting ideas as to how we might carry on the discussions of the Conference in our attempt to arrive at a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

It is mainly in connexion with method that I wish to speak today, although I shall revert later to some of the questions to which the Chairman and others have referred, that is, the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and how that is to be controlled. At the moment I should like to draw the attention of the Conference to the revised outline comparison ENDC/36 between the United States and the Soviet Union disarmament proposals.

The Canadian delegation has prepared this revision of its previous comparison ENDC/19/Rev.1 to take into account and fully to reflect the "Outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world" which was submitted by the United States delegation on 18 April 1962 ENDC/30/Corr.1. We now have before us, as members know, two comprehensive plans of disarmament -- the Soviet Union draft treaty ENDC/2 and the United States outline of a treaty. These two plans contain detailed proposals regarding disarmament, verification and the maintenance of international peace and security in a disarmed world. As we are all acutely aware, these proposals are extremely complex and must be seen in their proper relation to our common objective of general and complete disarmament. The Canadian delegation hopes that this comparison which it has prepared will serve to help us all to a better understanding of the concepts which have inspired the two plans and of their relative value in bringing about general and complete disarmament in a truly peaceful world.

In preparing this table the Canadian delegation had another purpose. We suggest that the process of comparison -- which is basically what we are engaged in -- is the very essence of our negotiations. Our immediate object is to elucidate and define the main points of difference between the various proposals before us and, concurrently, to identify the areas where agreement seems to be closer, as other speakers today have mentioned. This is indispensable if we are to bridge the gap between us through the formulation of realistic and mutually acceptable compromises. We should not forget that the treaty which we shall eventually be able to agree upon will be neither the Soviet draft treaty nor the United States outline of a treaty; it will be a composite text which may not quite resemble either. I would recall that the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber, said this in his intervention at the twenty-ninth meeting on 2 May.

What we will produce -- what we all hope to produce -- will be a draft treaty of this Conference, and it can be arrived at only by carefully and patiently comparing, discussing and assessing the provisions which are contained in the Soviet

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Union and United States plans, and by gradually reducing and finally eliminating through the process of negotiation and compromise every one of the differences between them.

It will therefore be seen that to us the comparative table which we have placed before the Conference is something more than just a technique of presentation to assist us in assimilating a difficult and complex problem; rather it reflects the very spirit in which we should like the highly important and arduous issues before us to be approached.

As we have state before, the Canadian delegation supports the United States programme of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world on which the draft treaty is based; but if the authors and supporters of each of the two plans, the Soviet plan and the United States plan, should merely continue to claim all virtues for their own plan and refuse to recognize any value in the other, we should have to resign ourselves to a dialogue de sourds, and sooner or later to an impasse in our discussions. It is incumbent upon all of us to see that this danger is averted.

In this connexion I would remind the Committee of the attitude of the delegation of the United States in this respect as stated by the Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, in his remarks at our second meeting. He said:

"It" -- he meant the United States programme for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world ENDC/67 on which the present United States draft outline of a treaty is based -- "is not immutable, however. It is designed to serve as a basis for negotiation." (ENDC/PV.2, page 20)

At our twenty-third meeting, the representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, in introducing the United States draft outline of a treaty, said:

"The United States wants this document, together with documents presented by other members of our Conference, to be considered by the Conference in its efforts to produce agreement on general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/PV.23, page 6)

The United States does not claim exclusive virtue and sole validity for its proposals; but I do not recall having heard so far any similar expressions of a necessary give-and-take in negotiations from the representatives of the Soviet Union.

To revert to the comparative table we have submitted, it will be noted that our previous comparison ENDC/19/Rev.1 briefly described how each of the measures proposed by the Soviet Union and the United States is to be apportioned

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

and carried out in each of three stages. Thus the table showed, in relation for example to nuclear weapon vehicles or to conventional armaments or to forces, how these are to be eliminated from 100 per cent at the beginning to zero per cent at the end of the disarmament process. The form in which that document was organized could be called the vertical approach to our work. In the later document which we have just submitted we have -- because this seems to reflect the Committee's preference -- identified and listed the various measures seriatim under each of three stages, which might be called the horizontal approach.

We think that both these ways of looking at the different measures from beginning to end of the disarmament process, and of apportioning them in stages, will be necessary in our work. The vertical approach has the merit, I think, of showing that both the Soviet Union and the United States are in fact pursuing the same ultimate objective of completely eliminating each category and type of weapon by the end of disarmament process, and that the main differences between them are essentially differences in timing and phasing. The merit of what I have called the horizontal approach is that it brings out in better articulation the relationship between the various measures proposed by the Soviet Union and by the United States for each of the three stages, and the way in which the military balance should be maintained throughout the disarmament process.

We therefore think, as I have said, that both ways of looking at the measures will be necessary in our negotiations. What matters is that we should keep in mind that both plans start from the same point and the same premise -- that is, the Agreed Principles ENDC/57 -- and strive to achieve the same ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament. This is a fact which some of us tend to forget too easily and which our Nigerian colleague brought out very well and aptly in his thoughtful intervention last Friday. He then said that the differences in timing and staging accentuated the differences in substance, which were not perhaps so significant as otherwise appeared. He drew the conclusion that what mattered was not so much the length of the disarmament process but the will and the determination of the parties to the treaty to see it through from beginning to end.

We entirely agree with him in this regard. We should like to add that what matters is not so much the positions we start from but the determination of all the members of this Conference to see through to the end the process of elaborating the draft of the treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom): I have listened with great interest to the statements made this morning by the representatives of Italy and Brazil. They contained a number of suggestions and a great deal of material on which my delegation will want to ponder carefully, and which I think may be of advantage in the progress of our work; we shall want to revert to these suggestions at later meetings.

I should also like to take this opportunity of expressing the great appreciation of my delegation for the effort which the representative of Canada has put into the preparation of the comparative table which he has placed before the Conference and which will be of great and continuing value to us all in pursuing our work.

Meanwhile, I should like to make one or two remarks on behalf of the United Kingdom arising out of our discussions at our thirty-first meeting. To begin with, I should like to pay a further tribute to the thoughtful and valuable statement made by the representative of Nigeria. There was a great deal in his intervention on which we will all want to ponder -- a great deal perhaps on which we can build. In particular I should like to note again his statement that, to him, verification, disarmament and confidence are one and the same thing. I could not agree more fully. Indeed, I thought the emphasis he placed on confidence was especially apt and just, and went to the heart of our problems here. The unfortunate fact is that the whole international scene is dominated by the lack of confidence. It is tragic that we are faced with a situation in which, in the words of the representative of the Soviet Union, "We are not prepared to take anyone at their word we ourselves do not ask that we should be taken at our word."

(ENDC/PV.21, page 27)

But we must be realists and must accept that that is the situation. At the same time, we can and should regard it as a challenge and do our utmost to reach an agreement which will help to build up a larger measure of confidence and trust. Pondering on this, I found one of Mr. Zorin's statements at our thirty-first meeting encouraging. He said:

"The Soviet Union wants an honest agreement without any ulterior motives and without any evil intentions 'under the jacket'."

(ENDC/PV.31, page 29)

There, in that statement, is perhaps a piece of common ground on which we can build. For the Western countries want the same thing. We also want a true and sincere agreement without any ulterior motives and without any evil intentions "under the jacket".

(Sir Michael Wright, United Kingdom)

In the present state of lack of confidence the problem is how all parties to a disarmament treaty can be sufficiently assured that there are in fact no evil intentions "under the jacket". How can this assurance be supplied? And I accept Mr. Zorin's statement that the Soviet Union wants it to be supplied. The trouble is that the Soviet proposals, as at present drafted, would not give this assurance.

Let me take the question of force levels and the reduction of conventional armaments. Article 11 of the Soviet draft treaty provides for the reduction in stage I of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and of the United States to a level of 1.7 million. There would also be agreed ceilings for the armed forces of all other States. Paragraph 3 of the same article provides for the reduction of conventional armaments in parallel. Mr. Zorin said at our thirty-first meeting:

"... under the Soviet draft treaty States will be left with only the armaments which are necessary to equip the agreed force levels and no more." (ibid., page 31)

These reductions, both of men and of weapons, would be treaty obligations. They would be obligations binding upon the signatories. If the obligations were not honoured, if the levels were not observed, it would be a case of evil intentions "under the jacket" -- precisely the danger which Mr. Zorin says we must avoid. And on that I agree with him. But how can there be assurance that these obligations are being honoured? Well, I would suggest that the point is dealt with in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles. The first sentence of the sixth of these principles states:

"All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations."
(ENDC/5, page 2)

I repeat, "are honouring their obligations." It follows, in my view, that unless there is to be a departure from the Agreed Principles, control must be such as to verify that there are no evil intentions "under the jacket": no exceeding of the agreed level, no failure to honour the obligations assumed. Yet it is exactly that which the Soviet Union has steadily refused so far to admit and for which the Soviet treaty proposals do not provide. In terms of weapons they provide for verification of bonfires of arms, yes; but for safeguards against the hiding of arms, no. Mr. Zorin has told us this again and again. He has now,

(Sir Michael Wright, United Kingdom)

if I understood him rightly, even said to us that if we were to accept the Soviet plan in toto his Government still would not accept what he calls control over armaments. In other words, the international disarmament organization would even then not be permitted to verify the presence or absence of war power remaining after destruction or of evil intentions "under the jacket".

The question of evil intentions "under the jacket" arises, of course, also in the context of the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles. Indeed, as the representative of Nigeria pointed out in his intervention at our thirty-first meeting, as soon as we begin to destroy a significant percentage of weapons what remains becomes very important. In fact, the higher the percentage destroyed, the more important the remainders become, until at the point of 100 per cent elimination the possession of even a few weapons "under the jacket" could give a decisive advantage to the country retaining them. The Soviet representative told us at our thirty-first meeting that if there were 100 per cent elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles the Soviet Union would agree to 100 per cent verification, and, he added, 100 per cent verification of the whole territory of the Soviet Union. But this statement, as I understood it, was governed by his earlier statement -- I hope it was not, but that was how I understood it -- that:

"... these must be measures of control over disarmament and not control over armaments." (ENDC/PV.31, page 40)

The question, therefore, is whether the 100 per cent inspection spoken of by Mr. Zorin would include verification that there are no weapons hidden "under the jacket". If it does include this, an important avenue of progress is opened up. If it does not include this, the problem remains with us both over conventional forces and arms levels and over nuclear delivery vehicles. It is, in fact, a thread running through our discussions from beginning to end.

How is it to be solved, as solved it must be if we are to get a treaty? The logical way, surely, is to admit that the Agreed Principles do, in fact, provide for verification to cover it and to apply this verification across the board. But if the Soviet Union is adamant in refusing this, then there is before us the United States compromise proposal for zonal inspection. I was glad to hear the representative of Nigeria say at our thirty-first meeting:

"The real point I am getting at is that we must give further close study to the proposal for zonal inspection, or similar proposals which would enable us to carry out verification of armaments at a

(Sir Michael Wright, United Kingdom)

significant level. In the opinion of my delegation there is a need to study further the proposal for zonal inspection in relation to the organization, composition and functions of the international disarmament organization. The more it is a game of chance the more confidence it will generate." (ENDC/PV.31, page 9)

I am fully in agreement with that statement, and I was also interested and glad to hear the representative of Brazil, in his eloquent intervention this morning, speak on very much the same lines. If, however, the Soviet Union should really turn down this proposal also, then, as Mr. Godber has said, we are justified in asking the Soviet Union to put forward other suggestions for solving the problem of evil intentions "under the jacket".

Now I have one or two comments to offer on the imbalance of defence security which, in our view, would be created by the Soviet proposals for stage I of disarmament. I will not today go over again the ground already covered by others on this matter, although I reserve the right of my delegation to revert at a later meeting to the issues involved. What I want to do this morning is to give one or two further clarifications of the United Kingdom attitude.

Under the Soviet proposals the Soviet Union would retain at the end of the first stage 1.7 million men armed with conventional weapons. The Soviet Union would also retain nuclear weapons, although nuclear delivery vehicles would have been scrapped. The United Kingdom equally would retain conventional forces and armaments up to a certain ceiling, and nuclear weapons, but no means of delivery. But the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries are land Powers. They can use roads, they can walk and ride and drive to help each other, or for any military purpose. The United Kingdom is an island. Our friends can come to our help and we can go to theirs only by using sea and air communications, and it is on ships and aircraft, rather than on land forces, that we rely for our defence and our communications. But under the Soviet proposals our naval ships and military aircraft capable of being nuclear weapons carriers -- and that means all of them, or virtually all of them -- would have been scrapped by the end of the first stage. The Warsaw Pact countries would be left with their traditional means of defence. Our traditional means of defence would almost wholly have disappeared. For the United Kingdom, therefore, the Soviet proposals for stage I would represent an imbalance in terms of our security.

(Sir Michael Wright, United Kingdom)

There is a second point. There are a number of countries, some of them small in size and weak in power compared with the Soviet Union, whose territory is situated not far from that of the Soviet Union. I have referred earlier today to the regrettable fact, which we must none the less face as a reality at present of the international scene, of acute mistrust and lack of confidence. A number of these countries do not have confidence in the intentions towards them of the Soviet Union. They have seen things happen to the freedom and independence of other countries which they do not want to happen to themselves. They want to maintain their freedom and independence. I am not saying whether or not their lack of confidence is justified. I am not seeking to be controversial: that is not my point at all. I am merely stating the fact that these countries themselves say they feel a lack of confidence. For this reason they have exercised the right of collective self-defence recognized by the Charter of the United Nations and have made defensive arrangements with countries in which they do have confidence. We here all look forward to the time when general and complete disarmament will have been accomplished and when these countries can really base their security upon strengthened -- yes strengthened -- peace-keeping machinery in a disarmed world. But until that time comes they have to rely on their friends and allies. The Soviet Union has itself entered into military alliances and does not practice neutrality. There is nothing wrong in that.

What would be the effect on the security of such countries of the Soviet proposals for stage I? In the case of those who rely, at least partly, for their security on the certainty of rapid aid from the United Kingdom and the United States, the situation would be that such aid could no longer reach them in time to be effective, and this for at least two reasons. First, there would not be any, or sufficient, naval vessels left to carry, convoy or protect the arrival of such aid. Second, there would be no military aircraft, or none of any consequence, to bring aid. All, or the major part, of such vessels and aircraft would have been scrapped as possible nuclear delivery vehicles. And added to all this is the fact that in most cases the territories of the countries in which they have a confidence are much further away than the territories of the countries in whose intentions -- I repeat, I do not say whether rightly or wrongly -- they do not have confidence. For these countries, therefore, as for the United Kingdom, the Soviet first-stage proposals would represent an imbalance of security.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I have listened to the various statements made this morning, and I must say that I have been much impressed by the very real contribution that they have all made to the carrying out of our task of drafting a treaty on general and complete disarmament. I think all of them have been exceptionally well presented; they are careful and thoughtful statements; and I am sure that a study of them will help our work to advance further. I thought the statements of the representatives of Italy and the United Kingdom were exceptionally interesting.

I again want to thank Mr. Burns of Canada for the very able work done by the Canadian delegation in document ENDC/36, and for his comments, which as usual are very helpful.

If I may say so, Mr. Chairman, I was particularly impressed with your very careful and interesting formulation of the problems involved. Although I know that at a conference of this kind it is somewhat discouraging not to be able to point to some specific agreements, the fact is that at this Conference we are all agreed on our overall objective: that is, that we must work out a treaty on general and complete disarmament. We have some differences of opinion as to the road or roads we should take to arrive at our goal. Those of us who are studying this problem want to be sure that we are going to arrive at our goal, and that we are not going to fall over precipices on the way, have bridges give way under us, or run into winter weather or starvation. We want to be sure that the road we travel will take us successfully to our goal of general and complete disarmament.

The two co-Chairmen have been meeting almost every afternoon. We met for several hours yesterday afternoon; we are meeting again this afternoon. While we are making progress slowly, I, for one, feel that we are making progress.

I would like this morning to continue to discuss armed force levels. Although I fully realize that these statements of mine outlining our proposed treaty sound more like a continuation of Sunday-school lessons, I hope I will be pardoned if I go on attempting to present our concept, at least, of the United States draft treaty. Again, although I am continuing to try to put before the Conference our own views with respect to the United States draft treaty, I would like to repeat the words of Secretary of State Rusk -- which Mr. Burns quoted this morning -- that we have an open mind as to how we are to arrive at our goal.

Members are all aware that the United States proposes that force levels of the United States, the Soviet Union and other specified parties be reduced to levels not exceeding 2.1 million men each in stage I. The representative of the Soviet

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Union expressed considerable surprise last week that the United States had not suggested a lower level than this. I am sure he will recall that before 1960 the United States had proposed a level of 2.5 million men for the United States and the Soviet Union in stage I. Then at the 1960 Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament the United States reduced this figure to 2.1 million men on the understanding that all "militarily significant States" would accede to the treaty in the first stage TNCD/7, page 47. A similar proposal was made by President Kennedy on 25 September last year, as members are all aware.

The present proposal of the United States represents a further movement in the direction of agreement, since we are now prepared to agree to 2.1 million force levels for both the United States and the Soviet Union without the accession of all militarily significant States during stage I. Although the Soviet Union proposes a lower level of armed forces, the objectives of the two countries are clearly the same. Both agree, in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, to the "disbanding of armed forces" to the point where States would have only those forces "necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens" and, in addition, to "provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force".

Moreover, the proposals of the two countries for force levels for militarily significant States at the end of stage II are almost identical: 1.05 million in the United States outline and 1 million in the Soviet draft treaty. Under these circumstances we do not believe that much can be made of the difference between the two countries' proposals for stage I.

I fully subscribe to the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber, that although in modern warfare it often is the armaments that are decisive rather than the number of men, nevertheless one must still have men. He said:

"... men who have been disbanded can always be called up again whereas armaments that have been actually destroyed cannot so easily be replaced." (ENDC/PV.29, page 9)

Now I suspect that men can be even more easily shifted from civilian to military employment in the Soviet Union than they can in the United States or in any other non-totalitarian country. In my country the Government has far greater difficulty in assigning individual citizens to specific jobs at short notice than is the case in a country where greater emphasis is placed on the needs of the State than on the needs or wishes of the individual. For these reasons it seems to me clear that a reduction of armed forces is more difficult to reverse in a short time in the United States than in the Soviet Union.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

By my agreement with Mr. Godber's statement on the importance of armaments I do not wish to suggest that armed force levels are unimportant -- and I do not believe that Mr. Godber did either. We have seen that armed manpower can be very important in modern warfare in many parts of the world. Moreover, my country would not wish to be without sufficiently trained men to protect its security during the disarmament process, because this would mean placing too much emphasis on nuclear weapons, with the resultant danger of escalation of a limited conflict into a nuclear holocaust.

In this connexion I find it interesting that, while the Soviet Union proposes a greater stage I cut in manpower than does the United States, the Soviet Union does not propose any reduction in nuclear weapons themselves, or the materials for their manufacture, in stage I. The far-reaching United States proposals applicable to nuclear weapons and the production of fissionable material in stage I were described in my speech of 4 May ENDC/PV.317.

It is also interesting in this connexion that in its draft outline the Soviet Union has no specific proposal for the reduction of conventional armaments in stage I. The Soviet draft treaty suggests that the armaments "released" by the disbanding of particular military units would be destroyed. But I point out that there is nothing in the Soviet draft which requires that troops now possessing modern conventional weapons of great fire-power should be disbanded in the first stage. Perhaps the stage I reduction would be largely of civilian employees and foot troops, with small -- or at least less effective -- arms; perhaps the reduction would apply to unarmed labourers, or to scientists who in our country may be on the rolls of the armed services but who may be on the rolls of national science institutes in the Soviet Union or in some other countries. So it must be determined where these men are listed and on what budget they are shown. Particular numbers in and of themselves, without comparison, may not be very impressive.

Neither does the Soviet draft prohibit an increase in the number of modern weapons in the hands of troops which are not to be disbanded in stage I. Thus it would be possible, at least, to transfer weapons from forces which were to be disbanded to forces which were not, before the disbanding took place.

I want to be clear: I do not suggest that this is the Soviet Union's intention. It is, however, permissible under the Soviet draft outline. In the United States outline such a transfer would be without purpose, because

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specific reductions of specified types within categories of conventional armaments would be required in stage I, regardless of which armed force units were using them. This is a very important distinction.

I point out these facts in my discussion of armed force levels because I think we all agree with Mr. Godber's comment that men who have been disbanded can always be called up again, whereas armaments that have been destroyed cannot so easily be replaced. We must therefore look at armaments while we consider armed forces, and we must apply specific measures to both; otherwise major cuts in armed forces might become essentially meaningless.

We have all agreed, I think, that disarmament must be balanced so that it does not provide any country with a military advantage in any stage. It is a fact of military logistics that reductions in total force levels bring more than proportional reductions in forces available for actual combat, particularly for the nation with the longest lines of supply from the place where they are produced to the place where they are to be used. As everyone knows, the United States has obligations to come to the aid of its allies in Europe, Asia and elsewhere if they are attacked. These obligations can be expected to continue until general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world has been achieved. The Soviet Union has some similar obligations -- which we understand --, but they are applicable to countries which are geographically close to the Soviet Union, as indeed the representative of Italy and the representative of the United Kingdom have pointed out this morning. In the circumstances, a cut to 1.7 million men, for instance, would have a far greater impact on the ability of the United States to defend itself and its allies than on the ability of the Soviet Union to defend itself and its allies.

An additional reason why a reduction to less than 2.1 million on each side is, in our judgement, not feasible in stage I relates to the problem of verifying the retained levels. The Soviet draft treaty outline provides for control only "at the places where troops are disbanded ...". This is clearly insufficient, for we would have no idea of what the retained level was. The United States outline, on the other hand, would provide some assurance that the retained level was not more than 2.1 million, by the use of a technique such as progressive zonal inspection, to which reference has been made by the Chairman this morning and by the representative of Nigeria on 4 May. However, we do not propose that anything like the entire Soviet Union -- or indeed even as much as half of the Soviet

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Union -- should be opened up to inspection during stage I. Thus our proposals for verification of retained levels are related to our proposals for reduction in armed forces. It follows from this that a greater cut would require greater inspection.

I have discussed the reasons for the differences in stage I force levels in the United States outline and the Soviet draft treaty. I now wish to describe some of the other differences.

Despite the differences in the names which the two States have given to their programmes, we find in fact that the United States outline is considerably more detailed than the so-called Soviet draft treaty. The United States outline not only establishes levels for the United States and the Soviet Union but provides a general rule for other States. Thus our draft outline provides that -

"All other Parties to the Treaty would, with agreed exceptions, reduce their force levels to 100,000 or one per cent of their population, whichever were higher, provided that in no case would the force levels of such other Parties to the Treaty exceed levels in existence upon the entry into force of the Treaty." (ENDC/30, page 7)

This provides an equitable rule based essentially on population with a 100,000 minimum force level. I would suggest that each of the representatives here compute the resulting level for his own country and determine whether the rule would be fair. Then we can discuss it. I would point out that there is no comparable provision in the Soviet draft treaty; but I am not aware that Mr. Zorin disagrees with this proposal.

The United States outline also makes an attempt at defining what is meant by armed forces; the Soviet so-called draft treaty says very little on this subject. I would call attention to the fact that we would include all full-time uniformed personnel maintained by governments in the following categories:

"a. Career personnel of active armed forces and other personnel serving in the active armed forces on fixed engagements or contracts.

"b. Conscripts performing their required period of full-time active duty as fixed by national law.

"c. Personnel of militarily organized security forces and of other forces or organizations equipped and organized to perform a military mission." (ibid.)

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Each country's armed forces are of course organized somewhat differently. This definition may not, therefore, be equitable for all, although we have tried our best to make it so. Again may I suggest that each representative here should attempt to apply the language of the United States outline to the armed forces of his own country to see whether it is fair to all? Then let each one of us raise the particular problems of definition which we find in our own country, so that the definition can be revised, if necessary, in order to make sure that it is fair; or, if no change is required, let us discuss it so that we can all understand its application.

As an example of the problems involved, let me point out that in the United States we have --- and many of the representatives here could make similar specific references to their own countries --- a civilian public health service. The employees of this civilian public health service wear military-appearing uniforms and have militarily equivalent rank, but they are all civilians and they have no connexion with our armed forces. Therefore our definition would not include the public health service as an armed force, despite these seemingly military attributes. I point this out in order to provoke discussion.

I wish now to discuss how the United States envisages that the armed force reduction would take place. As we see it, at an agreed date those parties required to reduce their force levels in stage I would submit a declaration with the necessary information regarding their forces on that date which came within the definition.

There have been some comments at this Conference that such a declaration would somehow constitute espionage or be too onerous. We really do not think that these contentions should stop us in our work. The United States itself would have no particular problems with such a declaration. And the Soviet Union has made proposals for similar declarations. On 10 May 1955 the Soviet Union proposed that States --

"shall furnish the Disarmament Commission, within one month after the entry into force of the convention, with complete official figures of the armed forces, conventional armaments, and expenditures for military requirements." (DC/SC.1/26/Rev. 2)

Similar declarations were called for in the Soviet proposals of 27 March 1956 /DC/SC.1/41 and Corr. [7] and of 19 September 1959 /A/42197. I recognize that the Soviet draft treaty that is now before us is not explicit on this point, but I

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hope that the Soviet Union is not backtracking on these earlier Soviet proposals. I submit that it is essential that the agreed text of the treaty -- which, as Mr. Burns and others have pointed out, is going to be a Conference draft treaty and not a United States or a Soviet draft treaty -- should be clear on this point.

After the declarations had been submitted, force level reductions would be accomplished in three steps, each having a duration of one year. During the first year, force levels would be reduced by one-third of the difference between the declared level and the levels to be reached by the end of stage I. The declaration would thus be essential to the application of the measure. During the next year a second one-third reduction would take place, and during the third year the stage I reduction would be completed.

During each year the reductions themselves would be verified by the international disarmament organization where they took place. In addition, a technique such as progressive zonal inspection -- or something else, if it were better -- would be used to provide assurance that the retained level was not larger than the declared level less the required reductions. Thus, the declaration itself would not be verified, and inspection would not precede disarmament. On the other hand, some assurance would be provided that the original declaration was accurate, through checks of both the reduction and the retained level. At the same time, assurance would also be provided that forces disbanded were not later reconstituted clandestinely. Consistent with the remark of Mr. Zorin which has been referred to before, no State would have to take any other State at its word.

I have already described the armed force level which the United States proposes for stage II and for completion of disarmament. In general, the method of reduction and of verification would continue in stages II and III as in stage I, with the amount of territory of each party to the treaty open to verification for retained levels increasing as the reduction in force levels becomes larger.

I submit that the United States outline presents the best method of achieving the goal set forth in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles without danger to the security of any State. But let me also say that we have an open mind on this matter. Moreover, the United States believes that the 2.1 million level for itself and the Soviet Union at the end of stage I is wholly reasonable, in view of the armaments which would be retained at the end of stage I under either plan, in view of the United States defence commitments to allies across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, in view of our willingness to proceed through stage I without the

(Mr. Dean, United States)

adherence -- I repeat, without the adherence -- of all militarily significant States, and in view of our major concession with respect to verification of retained force levels in the early years of the disarmament process.

I wish now to turn briefly to the remarks made on verification by Mr. Zorin at our meeting last Friday. I say with great respect that his remarks appear to put him in a dilemma. On the one hand, he states that no country should be expected to take another country at its word in matters relating to the implementation of agreed disarmament measures. On the other hand, he seems to be saying that, even under the Soviet Union stage I proposal to eliminate all means of delivering nuclear delivery vehicles, other countries would have to take the Soviet Union's word that it had not put some of its nuclear delivery vehicles aside and prevented them from being destroyed.

Members will recall the three questions which the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, asked concerning the interpretation to be given to Premier Khrushchev's offer to accept our proposals for controls if we accepted the Soviet proposal for general and complete disarmament. Mr. Zorin told us at last Friday's meeting that this remark would be interpreted as follows:

"... if the Western Powers accept the Soviet plan for disarmament with all its wide and thorough-going measures, with all their consequences, we will give carte blanche to the Western Powers to work out measures of control over each of these disarmament measures."

(ENDC/PV.31, page 40)

Thus we are required to accept general and complete disarmament precisely and exactly on Soviet terms, which, as has been indicated here earlier, are clearly and solely to the military advantage of the Soviet Union. This Soviet Union plan for general and complete disarmament was clearly designed in that way. Moreover, note Mr. Zorin's qualification, a qualification which, I submit, is so substantial as to make the carte blanche to which he referred meaningless. Mr. Zorin said:

"It is self-evident that these must be measures of control over disarmament and not control over armaments." (ibid.)

I ask, as our United Kingdom colleague asked earlier today: what does this mean? It seems to be a case of, "Now you see it, and now you do not see it". It seems that Mr. Zorin has cast himself in the role of the magician with the three balls. I refer members to the old rhyme with which they are all familiar:

(Mr. Dean, United States)

"Mother dear, may I go for a swim?

Yes, my darling daughter;

Hang your clothes on a hickory limb,

But don't go near the water."

As members all know by now, "control over disarmament" means something quite different to the Soviet Union from what it means to most of the rest of us here. This difference between "control over disarmament" and "control over armaments" is a Soviet cliché which we must explore. It seems to say something, but then immediately retracts it. Last summer Mr. McCloy and I were engaged in discussions with Mr. Zorin on the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles. The McCloy-Zorin correspondence relating to the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, as well as subsequent Soviet statements, show very clearly that "control over disarmament" does not include, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, verification that "retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage". I refer members to the McCloy-Zorin correspondence if they wish to see how explicit the Soviet Union was on that point.

One need only apply Mr. Zorin's interpretation of Premier Khrushchev's offer -- referred to this morning by the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns -- to a particular Soviet proposal to see how absurd the results would be. As members are aware, the Soviet draft treaty proposes a 100 per cent elimination of all nuclear delivery vehicles in stage I. Mr. Zorin's interpretation appears to mean that the international disarmament organization could watch the destruction of each delivery vehicle that the Soviet Union was prepared to offer for destruction, but that it could not -- I repeat, could not -- verify that all vehicles had in fact been offered. Apparently we would have to take the Soviet Union's word for the fact that it had in fact offered all its nuclear delivery vehicles for destruction. Yet this is precisely what Mr. Zorin said he could not expect us to do.

After Mr. Zorin's first intervention at last Friday's meeting, this dilemma came through clearly. Moreover, in Mr. Zorin's second intervention, he spoke of "verification of the 100 per cent reduction, or elimination, of the means of delivery". (ENDC/PV.31, page 50). This is clearly consistent with the meaning of his first statement, namely that the international disarmament organization could verify the destruction of each vehicle but that it could not verify -- I repeat, could not verify -- whether vehicles had been held back and hidden to prevent destruction.

Mr. Zorin then said that he agreed to "100 per cent verification on the whole territory of the Soviet Union" (ibid.). To avoid inconsistency with his earlier remarks, I take this to mean that the verification would take place wherever the delivery vehicles were destroyed at any point in the Soviet Union. If this is what Mr. Zorin meant, then, I submit, his dilemma remains. On the one hand he is proposing verification measures which preclude checking whether a country has held delivery vehicles back from destruction. On the other hand, he is insisting that no country should have to take the word of another country on an important point like this.

Thus two things are quite apparent: first, the Soviet Union proposes a measure which, by virtue of its unbalancing effect, is not in accord with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles and therefore is unacceptable; and secondly, it wishes us to accept not only that measure but also such controls over it as would offer no guarantee -- I repeat, no guarantee --- that it had in fact been implemented by all parties.

If I have misconstrued Mr. Zorin's language, I wish that he would promptly set the record straight.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, may I say that I listened with the greatest interest to your suggestions this morning for possible changes between stage I and stage II? I wish to assure you that my Government will give them the most careful and sincere study.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Today we have heard many substantive statements covering a considerable range of questions. We shall, of course, have to study attentively all the arguments put forward by the various delegations, and give appropriate answers in due course, especially in regard to the part concerning the position of the Soviet Union and the proposals put forward by the Soviet Government for discussion in this Committee. In view of the shortage of time at present and the need for a closer study of the verbatim records, I do not intend to say anything about the statements dealing with these questions. I should merely like to avail myself of the remaining time in order to note two points which seem to me to be of some importance for our future discussions.

Today the representative of Italy, speaking about the atmosphere and the tone of our discussions, seemed to me to completely contradict what he had said at the beginning of his statement. He tried to describe the situation which has

come about, as he put it, in the two blocs, and gave an account of the systems existing in Western Europe and other countries, and of the alleged intentions of the communists to destroy these systems, and so forth.

I think that if he goes on talking in such a tone, in such a way, we shall, of course, not let this go without an answer; and I think that then the question of the tone and the nature of our statements will lie entirely on the conscience of the representative of Italy. In any case we are not children, and we all understand perfectly well, I think, that the systems established in Western Europe -- in particular such systems as that of Franco or of Salazar, who are allies of Italy and of a number of other countries -- cannot, of course, be regarded by any of us as free systems, as systems which can be described as model democracies. I do not wish to pursue this path. I only wish to say that in my view it is not worth while taking this path, because if we were to take this path, I do not think that our Western colleagues would have any convincing arguments with which to defend such systems.

In the same connexion I think that the arguments put forward by the representative of Italy concerning the Warsaw Pact bases in the Caucasus are also utterly amazing. They were put forward merely for the purpose of justifying in some way the existence of foreign bases in alien territories, in particular in the territory of Turkey, which was mentioned, and in the territory of Italy itself. This is the only possible explanation for what I would call the absurd supposition that there are Warsaw Pact bases in the territory of the Caucasus. In any case, I can state officially that no Warsaw Pact bases exist in the territory of the Caucasus; they exist only in the imagination of the representative of Italy.

That is one of the remarks I wanted to make. I think that we shall not take this path and that we shall avoid any kind of qualification of various countries, because if we were to take this path, the qualification which would be given by us and which would correspond to the actual state of affairs would not be likely to create a cheerful frame of mind in our Western colleagues.

The other remark which I wished to make concerns our future work. In this connexion views have already been expressed concerning the need for an informal exchange of opinions on a number of questions which have now emerged and in regard to which certain efforts are required in order to try to find common ground for further fruitful consideration and mutually-acceptable decisions.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

When this question was raised I made a statement, as you know, and I said that the Soviet delegation did not exclude the possibility of such an informal exchange of views. I now want to deal with the practical side of this question. As co-Chairman I received an informal proposal of the representative of India, who also approached, so I understand, the United States representative as the other co-Chairman with a proposal that there should be an informal discussion of the questions before the Committee.

I fully accept this proposal. I hope that my colleague, the United States co-Chairman, will also accept it. I suggest that we tackle this question in a practical way and arrange for an informal meeting of the Committee at 3 p.m. tomorrow in order to consider the questions of general and complete disarmament as they have emerged up to the present in connexion with consideration of the questions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, in particular, the question of the first stage which is now under discussion. I think this will be useful. We could exchange views informally on this question and try to find safe ground for further discussion of this question, or at least to ascertain the positions on which we are coming closer together and those on which we diverge in order to see the future possibilities of our work.

I propose that this should be done tomorrow afternoon, because tomorrow morning's meeting will be devoted to discussion of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, as we have agreed. I presume that we shall thus be able to give our attention at 3 p.m. to the question which we have discussed today, especially as a number of what I consider important views have been expressed today on the whole of this problem and on our future work in this direction. I think it would be useful for us to discuss this.

As regards further informal meetings, I think this can be decided after tomorrow's meeting. It may be asked, of course, why I propose having two meetings on the same day. I think that tomorrow we shall be able to finish the discussion of the question of the discontinuance of tests before two o'clock, perhaps even shortly before one o'clock, and it seems to me that it will be possible to discuss informally the question of general and complete disarmament.

I think that we simply have to speed up our work, because the representative of Brazil was right when he said today that, although we have spent more than half the time allotted to us before submitting the first report to the United Nations Disarmament Commission, we have unfortunately made very little progress on some of

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

the substantive questions involved in our main task. I think we ought to speed up our work, in particular by holding informal meetings. In view of the fact that for informal meetings we do not have to prepare any texts of our statements, I think we could hold an informal meeting at 3 p.m. tomorrow. If this is agreeable to my co-Chairman, I think we can usefully avail ourselves of this opportunity.

The CHAIRMAN (Brazil) (translation from French): The representative of the Soviet Union has agreed to the Indian representative's proposal that informal meetings be held to discuss the problem of the treaty on general and complete disarmament in a freer atmosphere. I will now ask Mr. Dean, the United States representative, whether he agrees to the first of these meetings being held tomorrow at 3 p.m., as proposed by the representative of the Soviet Union.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): The suggestion of the representative of India that we meet informally is quite acceptable to my delegation; in fact, I think it is a very useful suggestion. As members know, in paragraph 3 of our memorandum with respect to the procedure of work we agreed that:

"Informal meetings should, normally, be held on days on which no plenary meeting is scheduled." (ENDC/12)

A meeting of the Sub-Committee on nuclear testing had been scheduled for Wednesday afternoon. The two co-Chairmen also hold meetings. In addition, we must prepare for the plenary meetings. All of this involves a great deal of work. If it were agreeable to my co-Chairman, I would suggest that we hold the informal meeting on Thursday morning instead of a plenary meeting, rather than holding two meetings tomorrow. That would be, I think, more in accordance with the spirit of our agreement.

I would suggest to my co-Chairman that we hold the first informal meeting Thursday morning instead of a plenary meeting. Tomorrow morning's plenary meeting is to be devoted to the subject of nuclear testing. I would hope that would be agreeable to everyone.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I have listened to what the representative of the United States has just said. Our delegation would prefer to speed up our work. But if the United States delegation believes that it would be too much of a burden to have two meetings tomorrow, we, of course, shall not object to holding on Thursday a first

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

informal meeting devoted to questions of general and complete disarmament, although we believe that it will not be possible for us to avoid having a period of work when we shall have to hold meetings twice a day -- that is, one official meeting and one informal meeting on the same day. But since at this present stage we are perhaps not prepared for this, I have no objection to arranging a first informal meeting for Thursday morning, that is to say instead of the plenary meeting.

The CHAIRMAN (Brazil) (translation from French): If the members of the Committee agree, the first informal meeting will take place Thursday morning.

It was so decided.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I should like to say first that I shall naturally make a most careful examination of the Soviet representative's statement concerning what I said this morning. I think my words were very carefully weighed and could neither alter nor distort the tone of our discussions. That, at least, was my intention when I took the floor.

As regards the question of private meetings, I myself raised that point again this morning. So I should like to thank the two co-Chairmen for accepting the Indian representative's proposal, with which I am happy to associate myself.

I would like to add, however, that it would be wise to adhere strictly to the rules of procedure we adopted at the beginning of our Conference. The reason why we adopted them was, in fact, that we knew it was necessary to proceed quickly, but at the same time with a balanced progress that would give us time for reflexion and allow us to form our opinions conscientiously and in full knowledge of the facts. That is why I fully support the principle that there should be only one meeting a day. I hope that our progress will always be sufficiently satisfactory for us not to need two meetings a day, which for several delegations would, I think, cause too great an increase in the work.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its thirty-third meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. de Mello-Franco, the representative of Brazil.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Poland, Italy, Brazil, Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 9 May 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

